While artillery duels grind on in the trenches, Kyiv is betting on a highly experimental drone technology that can both float and fly, potentially rewriting the balance of power in the Black Sea.
A clandestine pact around “float-and-fly” drones
According to Ukrainian defence sources, state conglomerate Ukroboronprom has struck a discreet partnership with US start-up LeVanta Tech Inc., a young firm working on advanced hybrid platforms that blur the line between boats and aircraft.
The agreement, reportedly finalised during the DFNC3 defence forum, centres on a concept LeVanta calls “float-and-fly”. The idea: unmanned craft that skim just above the water at high speed, then drop back to the surface to float, refuel, rearm or hide from radar.
Kyiv believes these sea‑skimming drones could turn the Black Sea into a denial zone for Russia’s ageing but still powerful fleet.
While many of the details remain classified, Ukrainian officials have openly hinted at plans to bring at least part of the production onto Ukrainian soil, with training programs for local engineers and weapons specialists built into the deal.
How LeVanta’s Halia drones work
At the heart of the agreement lies LeVanta’s “Halia” family of ground-effect vehicles. These are not classic drones or boats, but hybrid machines designed to fly just a few metres above the surface, riding on a cushion of air generated by their own speed.
That phenomenon, known as the ground effect, reduces drag and allows relatively small craft to travel farther and faster than a normal low-flying aircraft would manage with the same fuel.
The three Halia variants on the table
LeVanta has publicised three Halia configurations, each of which interests Ukrainian planners for different mission profiles:
- Halia‑S – a civil or logistics platform with an electric motor and a range of around 400 km.
- Halia‑M – a compact military version, with options for electric or jet propulsion and up to 3,200 km of range.
- Halia‑X – a larger, fully military craft, jet-powered and capable of roughly 5,000 km.
For Ukraine, the civil Halia‑S is mostly interesting as a testbed: it can be adapted for coastal surveillance, mine detection or cargo. The real game changers would be the M and X variants, which can potentially carry warheads, sensors or electronic warfare payloads to targets deep in contested waters.
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The Black Sea fleet sits hundreds of kilometres from Ukrainian-held shores, yet Halia‑M and Halia‑X ranges suggest those distances are no longer safe.
Why these drones worry the Russian navy
Ukraine has already shown that creative use of unmanned systems can offset a numerical disadvantage at sea. Naval drones and Neptune anti-ship missiles have damaged or sunk several Russian ships and forced others to redeploy further from Ukrainian ports.
Halia-type systems add a new layer. By flying just above the waves at up to roughly 277 km/h, they combine advantages of surface drones and low-flying aircraft in one platform.
| Feature | Traditional naval drone | Halia float-and-fly drone |
|---|---|---|
| Operating mode | On the surface | Skims above water and can float |
| Speed | Moderate | High (near small aircraft speed) |
| Radar visibility | Low, but predictable | Very low near the surface, with altitude variation |
| Range | Limited | Up to several thousand kilometres |
| Main weakness | Sea state, interception by patrol boats | Vulnerability to air defences like Pantsir‑S1 |
Russian air-defence systems, such as the Pantsir‑S1, are designed to engage low-flying threats, but a fast, sea‑hugging target that can briefly hop over obstacles presents a different problem from a traditional cruise missile or drone.
These drones could approach at wave-top height, masked by clutter on radar, then rise just enough to avoid coastal structures or ship superstructures, before diving toward a vulnerable section of hull or pier.
From Crimea to Sevastopol: likely targets and tactics
Ukraine’s target set in the Black Sea is clear: warships still operating out of Crimean ports, support vessels, fuel depots, repair docks and logistical hubs around Sevastopol and beyond.
Military analysts outline several ways float‑and‑fly drones could fit into this campaign:
- Long-range raids against ships that have retreated eastward, beyond the reach of current naval drones.
- Swarm attacks combining Halia drones with conventional surface drones to overload Russian defences.
- Decoy operations where some drones carry radar reflectors or emitters, drawing fire away from the main strike package.
- Port disruption through repeated hits on repair yards and munition depots, forcing ships to relocate again.
Used in numbers, these vehicles could slowly turn the Black Sea from a Russian stronghold into a contested grey zone.
In practice, any actual attempt to “wipe out” the entire Russian fleet would face massive obstacles: layered air defence, electronic jamming, unpredictable sea states, and Russia’s own capacity to adapt. Yet even partial success would have strategic effects, pushing Russian ships farther from Ukrainian shores and constraining their missile-launch positions.
Technical hurdles and production realities
For now, the programme remains at an early stage. No public contracts for full-rate production or deliveries have appeared, and Ukrainian officials acknowledge that these systems will not suddenly appear in large numbers.
Integrating advanced propulsion, navigation and communication systems into a platform that must operate just metres above choppy seas is complicated. Stability, icing, salt-water corrosion and GPS interference from Russian jammers all pose serious engineering challenges.
There is also the question of cost. High-end jet-powered variants like the Halia‑X will not be cheap. Ukraine will need to decide whether to treat them as expendable kamikaze drones, reusable strike platforms, or a mix of both.
International ripple effects
Ukraine is not the only actor watching this technology. NATO navies have long toyed with ground-effect craft concepts. China and Iran have also experimented with low-flying sea skimmers and unmanned boat swarms.
Widespread combat use of float‑and‑fly drones in the Black Sea would send a strong signal: surface fleets near hostile coasts are increasingly vulnerable not only to missiles, but also to cheap, nimble hybrid drones.
Future coastal defence could rely as much on swarms of semi‑autonomous sea skimmers as on traditional frigates and submarines.
That prospect raises strategic questions for every navy that still invests heavily in big, expensive ships operating close to shorelines bristling with unmanned threats.
Key concepts behind the “float-and-fly” idea
Several technical notions help explain why Halia-type platforms are so attractive to Ukraine’s planners.
- Ground effect: when an aircraft flies very close to a surface, typically below one wingspan in altitude, aerodynamic drag drops and lift increases. This makes flight more efficient and extends range.
- Asymmetric warfare: a weaker power uses unconventional tools and tactics to offset a stronger opponent’s advantages. Naval drones, sea mines and hacked navigation systems all fit this logic.
- Hybrid domain operations: systems that can operate across air, sea and sometimes land or cyber domains complicate detection and response, stretching an enemy’s sensors and decision-making.
By combining ground effect with unmanned control and modular payload bays, developers can tailor each mission: one day a drone can carry explosives, another day cameras, radar or electronic jammers.
What happens if these drones reach scale
If Ukraine and LeVanta manage to overcome the technical and industrial hurdles, the Black Sea could become a real-time laboratory for a new class of weapons.
One scenario often floated by analysts involves coordinated “waves” of mixed systems. First, cheap, short-range drones and decoys flush out Russian defences. Then, long-range Halia‑M or Halia‑X drones follow up, targeting radars, missile tubes and command ships. In parallel, special forces or cyber units might aim at ports and logistics networks ashore.
This kind of layered strike package does not guarantee success, but it multiplies the angles of attack Russia must guard against. It also accelerates the arms race in autonomy, sensing and counter‑drone technologies around the Black Sea, with clear risks of miscalculation if systems malfunction or behave unpredictably near civilian shipping lanes.
For coastal states beyond Ukraine and Russia, from Romania to Turkey, the spread of such float‑and‑fly weapons would force a rethink of port security, air defence coverage and even commercial shipping insurance, as the boundary between military and civilian maritime space becomes harder to police.
